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Abstract. The bilaterally monopolistic nature of relationships between part-
ners, combined with the addictive nature of love, which represents the emotion
people feel during the course of a relationship, results in love growth when re-
lationships are based on commitment. However, in relationships with less than
perfect commitment, love will wither, and potentially die. In this paper, the
path of love through a relationship is examined under the assumption that
love is addictive and that partners may or may not be able to commit to a
relationship. The diﬀerences in the results suggest that cohabiting partners
may, by their very lack of commitment at the outset, be unsuited to successful
marriages.
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1. Introduction
Recent trends in social attitudes (mirrored by the establishment of unilateral
divorce laws, often referred to as no-fault divorce laws), and economic indepen-
dence (shown by the reduction in the wage diﬀerential between males and females),
have changed the relationship dynamics between potential suitors and couples in
the marriage market. In particular, divorce is far more common than it was in
the past. As suggested by Becker, Landes & Michael (1977), Sander (1985), and
Sweezy & Tiefenthaler (1996), an increase in female earnings is associated with
an increase in the probability of divorce; however, that result may be, as Becker
et al. (1977) suggested, due to self-fulﬁlling expectations.
1 Research by Johnson &
Skinner (1986), however, does not lend support to the self-fulﬁlling expectations
hypothesis.
2
Another possible reason for increases in the divorce rates is due to changes in
the legal institutions surrounding marriage. The eﬀect of the change in the divorce
laws in many states, for example, has eﬀectively reduced the cost of divorce, and,
therefore, should have increased the divorce rates in those states. However, the
empirical link has not been established, e.g., Peters (1986) and Gray (1998), at
least for any extended period of time, e.g., Wolfers (2000). Recent research by
Binner & Dnes (2001) has been the exception; they use time series data to show
that the introduction of no-fault divorce laws has increased the rate of divorce in
England and Wales.
Theoretically, the diﬃculty in establishing a link between easier divorce avail-
ability and increased divorce in the aggregate is not surprising. A reduction in the
cost of exit should lead to an increase in the number of entrants, thus increasing
the divorce rate denominator; therefore, the overall divorce rates may remain quite
stable. However, that theoretical possibility does not square with data showing
relatively stable marriage rates at the same time, although those marriages, on
average, began at later ages than in the past, Schoen & Standish (2001).
3
1Females expecting a divorce may begin more earnest participiation in the labor market. Their
subsequent reduction in home activities may, in turn, lead the male to instigate a divorce.
2Their simultaneous equations estimation shows that an increased future probability of divorce
raises female labor supply, while increases in female labor supply do not lead to increases in the
probability of divorce.
3They ﬁnd that 83% of men and 88% of women will eventually marry, but men and women are
getting married at later ages. Interestingly, marriages that begin at later ages are less likely toLOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
† 3
A more likely possibility is that some substitution between formal marriage and
cohabitation has taken place. The reduction in social stigma associated with cohab-
itation has made entry into less formal arrangements less costly relative to marriage.
Simultaneously, the relative exit cost of a relationship will be lower for cohabita-
tion, despite the reduction in divorce costs. The reduction in the relative entry
costs combined with the increase in relative exit costs has probably kept the actual
divorce rate relatively constant. However, empirical examinations do not readily
support the relative cost of entry versus exit hypothesis, either. For example, Wa-
ters & Ressler (1999) ﬁnd: a) higher divorce rates are associated with an increased
likelihood of cohabitation, and b) higher rates of cohabitation are associated with
increased divorce probabilities.
Despite the absence of direct empirical support, at this time, that relative entry
and exit costs matter, there does seem to be anectdotal support for the hypothesis,
especially concerning the reduction in the relative social cost associated with cohab-
itation. A survey of cohabitants, non-married couples living together, by Ressler
& Waters (1995), revealed many who viewed their arrangement as a trial mar-
riage.
4 According to Berrington & Diamond (2000), nearly 60% of ﬁrst-partnership
cohabitations in Britian become marriages by the time respondents reach age 33.
Evidence presented by Cherlin (1992) and Bacrach, Hindon & Thomson (2000) lend
further credence to an increase in the rate of cohabitation; however, they suggest
that these cohabitants, most of whom will eventually marry each other, are more
likely to enter into a marriage that will end in divorce.
The preceding data present a puzzle not easily explained by current models
of marriage and households. Importantly, if cohabitation is meant to be a trial
marriage, it would be reasonable to presume that only successful trials eventually
lead to actual marriage, and those marriages ought to be more successful as well.
However, the data suggests otherwise, i.e., divorce rates actually increase with rates
of cohabititation. In other words, there may be a fundamental diﬀerence between
cohabiting partners and marriage partners, such that the experience of cohabitation
end in divorce, which may partly explain the leveling of the divorce rate at approximately 43% of
marriages.
4Within the survey, 51% of the men and 56% of the women were cohabitating as a compatibility
check.4 STEVEN F. KOCH
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cannot be easily transversed preceding the marriage, resulting in optimal behavior
that is Pareto dominated.
Below, I present a model suggesting there is an important diﬀerence between
cohabiting, non-committed couples, and married, committed partners. The dif-
ference, the commitment to provide love, leads to a growing love relationship for
some, while a lack of commitment amongst cohabitants leads to opportunistic, us-
ing behavior amongst partners. Members within the cohabiting relationship, fully
cognizant of the potential to be used, underinvest in their relationships. Because
there is less love without commitment than with commitment, cohabiting partners
may be less successful marriage partners than those whose partnership was initially
based on a commitment, e.g., a marriage.
5 In Section 2, I continue by marrying,
pun intended, the ﬁrm literature with the family formation literature. A simple
two-period model is presented in Section 3 and analyzed in Section 4. The conclu-
sion of the paper, in Section 5, discusses limitations and useful extensions of the
present analysis.
2. Literature
The literature on family formation can be traced to three pioneering papers:
Becker’s (1973) seminal paper on marriage, Becker’s (1974) paper on the inﬂuence
of market conditions on diﬀerent marriage formations, and Becker et al.’s (1977)
paper on marriage dissolution. Many contributions have been made to the under-
standing of families, because of these three papers. Marriages are most likely to
occur between people with similar traits.
6 Furthermore, marriage in the Beckerian
formulation is due to expectations of supermodularity in the household production
function.
7 Poor realizations of the random variables, over which the expectations
were originally made, are important determinants of dissolution of the couple.
8
5 The distinction between marriage and cohabitation, based on level of commitment, cannot
apply to all marriages and cohabitations, but is used for exposition purposes. This research does,
however, beg another question, what will lead to perfect commitment? Thoughts on that will be
discussed later.
6 Nakosteen & Zimmer (2001) provide evidence of positive marital matching on the basis of
similarities between earnings.
7The expectation is that combined production will be greater than the sumtotal of individual pro-
ductivities due to economies of scale resulting from specialization in various household production
activities, Shimer & Smith (2000).
8Support for the dissolution hypothesis has been provided by Boheim & Ermisch (2001). Their
results suggest couples who experience an improvement in economic conditions are less likely to
get a divorce than couples who do not experience an improvement.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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The Beckerian approach does not, generally, distinguish between cohabitation
and marriage; however, Becker, himself, alludes to long-term contracts and the
importance of commitment, “Since married women have been specialized to child-
bearing and other domestic activities, they have demanded long-term ‘contracts’
from their husbands to protect them from abandonment and other adversities.”
9
Along the preceding lines, Murphy (2002) has developed an institutional model
of marriage, wherein marriage is a public signal and is costly to exit, while informal
relationships are not costly to exit. Divorce, in his model, creates a costly tag,
which makes it more diﬃcult for men to be remarried. However, this theory does
not accord well with the fact that men are far more likely to be remarried following
a divorce than women, especially if there are children.
10
The ﬁrm formation literature, on the other hand, can be traced to the seminal
work of Coase (1937), who suggested that ﬁrms exist as an institution to reduce
the transcactions costs associated with spot markets.
11 Although many diﬀerent
types of transactions costs exist, the focus of much of the research in this area was
on the ex post hold-up problem.
12 Due to the hold-up problem, i.e., a ﬁrm takes
advantage of an asset speciﬁc investment to charge another ﬁrm more than was
originally agreed upon, the ﬁrm that is held-up may ﬁnd it in their best interest to
purchase the ﬁrm doing the holding-up, or vice-versa.
Applying the same logic to households, formations might occur in order to re-
duce the transactions costs associated with market transactions. In particular,
reproduction may not lend itself well to the market process. According to Becker’s
(1973) theory, households form, in part, to take advantage of increased special-
ization possibilities and related economies of scale. It is likely that specialization,
9See Becker (1991) p. 137.
10Divorced women with children are 25% less likely to remarry than women without children
(Da Vonza & Rahman (1994) from Bergstrom (1996)). Divorced men remarry at a rate of about
78%, while, for women, the remarriage percentage is only 69% (Schoen & Standish (2001)).
11A plethora of research has resulted from Coase’s (1937) initial insight. Much of the discussion
within the “Nature of the Firm” research is beyond the scope of this paper, however, an excellent
overview of the eﬀect of Coase’s insight can be found in Williamson & Winter (1993), Holmstrom
& Tirole (1989), and Williamson (1989), where the reader is directed.
12The classic case study was that of the purchase of Fisher Body by General Motors in 1926,
which was thought to have occurred due to the desire of GM to eliminate the contractual hold-up
problems resulting from required asset speciﬁc investments. However, as Casadesus-Masanell &
Spulber (2000) have discovered, an initial 60% purchase was made in 1919, and the remaining
purchase was made to improve the alignment of production and inventories as well as to provide
GM with access to the talents of the Fisher brothers.6 STEVEN F. KOCH
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within a household, could increase transactions costs, especially in the underin-
vestment or hold-up categories. The model in this paper takes advantage of the
potential for hold-up in a relationship between two individuals that are specialized
in their household production; one is the provider of love, while the other is the
recipient of love.
13 Because love is complementary through time and a provider has
within-match market power, the result of the model presented here is similar to the
results presented in a number of papers concerning complementary monopoly.
14
Under the assumption that commitments cannot be guaranteed, insuﬃcient in-
vestment is undertaken. Therefore, in this model, the hold-up is in terms of love.
After people meet in the marriage market, so aﬀectionately called the meat market,
they begin relationships. Those relationships require large investments in time and,
speciﬁcally, love. Love is addictive, in the Iannaccone (1986) and Becker & Murphy
(1988) sense, simlpiﬁed here as more love today leads to a greater desire for love in
the future. Since the addicted individual is willing to ‘pay’ more for future love, the
love monopoly provider has an incentive to cheat on future provisions of love by,
for example, withholding love in an eﬀort to withdraw even larger payments from
the love addict. Given the incentive to cheat in later stages of the partnership,
the partners will rationally choose to underinvest in love, initially. Therefore, mar-
riage, or some other commitment device, as an institution, may Pareto dominate
any other alternative, such as cohabitation.
15
3. The Model
Consider the behavior of one of the members of a couple, where the couples are
assumed to be symmetric, and, therefore, the analysis of one partner is suﬃcient
for understanding behavior within the partnership. There are two types of partner-
ships, commitment and non-commitment, which are meant to encompass marriage
and cohabitation, respectively. It is assumed that the partners have already been
matched; this model does not include a matching equilibrium. Rather, the model
provides insight into the behavior of individuals within the match.
13Of course, each individual in the match is assumed to be a provider and recipient; however, only
one side of the match is analysed.
14A recent paper providing an excellent discussion is by Feinberg & Kamien (2001).
15Importantly, marriage and cohabitation are two terms meant to capture the level of commitment
within a relationship, not necessarily the legal component of the relationship.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
† 7
Following the formation of the couple, each partner has within-partnership mar-
ket power, i.e., one partner is presumed to be the only person capable of providing
the love sought by the other partner. Furthemore, love is an addictive commod-
ity.
16 Because love is addictive, there are important intertemporal components, and,
therefore, the match must be followed through time. For this reason, the match is
examined over two periods.
17
3.1. Desire. Each partner is assumed to desire love from the other partner. The
love they desire is assumed to be addictive, i.e., current positive love experiences
increase the desire for future love experiences. The addictive nature of love is dy-
namic, and, therefore, the dynamic demand for love is considered over two periods,
the shortest allowable time period for the incorporation of dynamics. Generically,
inverse addictive demand, based on the model by Becker & Murphy (1988), for love
in any period t is given by
pt = pt(qt−1,qt,qe
t+1;α), (1)
where α < 1 captures the degree of complementarity across time periods. Demand
today depends on the past as well as the expectation of future love provision. The
discussion below will focus on the inverse demands, p1 and p2, and, therefore, the
quantities q0 and q3 need to be pinned down. The easiest interpretation is that
individuals come into the relationship with an established amount of love for each
other, q0, and that their relationships end after two periods, so that q3 is zero.
However, in order to appeal to symmetry in the solutions below, love outside the
match period is also assumed to be symmetric, so that q3 = q0 = ¯ q.18
16Iannaccone (1986) provides conditions on utility, called adjacent complementarity, and derived
demand, which lead to addiction, as used here. Intertemporal complementarity has a long history
in the economics literature dating back to Marshall’s (1920) discussion of the likelihood that
habits, or past consumption experiences aﬀect current consumption decisions. In addition, a
number of ideas that have appeared in the economics literature: habit formation, Pollak (1970);
addiction, Becker & Murphy (1988); learning-by-doing, Arrow (1961), and consumer switching
costs, Klemperer (1995) are all models involving intertemporal complementarity, Koch (2001).
17An interesting extension is the potential for match-breaking in each period. Presumably, that
would reduce the monopoly power assumed in this formulation, thus decreasing the ability of one
partner to use the other. On the other hand, one partner may have more options outside the
match than the other, which could actually increase the market power of one partner within the
match.
18Symmetry outside the match could be interpreted as a match market equilibrium. For example,
in order for a match to occur, love, or the interest therein, can never be less than some amount
¯ q. In fact, an assumption that no love is initially brought into the relationship so none can be
taken away at the end, would be the easiest interpretation. For example, it could be assumed that8 STEVEN F. KOCH
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This desire curve, although simple, is enough to elicit the important diﬀerences
between a monogamist, and a user. Throughout the paper, desire is assumed to be
linear, so that,
(2) pt(·) = A + αqt−1 − qt + αqt+1.
Addiction or intertemporal complementarity is assumed to be symmetric with re-
gard to future expectations about love, as well as past experiences with love. Unfor-
tunately, interpretational diﬃculty lies with p, the price paid for love. Preferably,
the willingness to pay for love represents the willingness of one partner to sacriﬁce
their own pursuits for their mate, a standard opportunity cost.
3.2. Supply. Each partner is presumed to provide love to their partner. However,
despite the potential for outside options in the partnering market, once the partner-
ship has been formed, each of them has within-match market power; it is assumed
that your mate is the only one allowed to provide love to you. Providers of love are
not entirely selﬁsh, since they receive felicity from their partner’s happiness, which
is a parameterized measure of the love provided, as well as the returns to the love
provided. Therefore, the provider of love’s felicity is described by
u(qt) =σv(qt) + π(qt)
=σv(qt) + (pt − c)qt
(3)
where σ · v(qt), given 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, measures happiness from providing love to your
partner, interpreted as the degree to which one cares about one’s partner.19 It is
assumed that v(qt) is quadratic and concave, v0 > 0, v00 < 0, and v000 = 0. However,
σ ·v0(0) → c is required for the opportunity cost of love production to remain non-
negative, i.e., for the match to exist. The opportunity cost of providing additional
love, denoted by c, is assumed to be constant.20 In order for love to be provided in
the match, A > c is assumed, where A represents the extent of love.
love is not oﬀered before the match, so that q0 = 0, and the relationship ends in death after two
periods, so that q3 = 0.
19As σ → 0, the supplier of love is completely selﬁsh, while larger values of σ imply more selﬂess-
ness.
20The inclusion of a ﬁxed cost could be used to model outside options for the provider, but it
would not aﬀect behavior other than inﬂuencing actual participation in the match. For that
reason, outside options (and ﬁxed costs) are ignored in the following analysis.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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Given the fact that current felicity depends on past and future love provision, it




βt−1σv(qt) + [pt − c]qt,
where, under the assmption of perfect capital markets, β = 1/(1+r) is the market
determined valuation of future ﬂows of happiness.
4. Results
In this section, the properties of love provision are examined under two diﬀer-
ent circumstances, commitment and non-commitment. Although the commitment
device is not deﬁned, it is assumed to be perfect, i.e., the lover will not deviate
from the optimal path of love. However, non-commitment is meant to imply the
potential for deviation from the prescribed path.
The primary result from the analysis is that commitment matters. If love can be
provided under commitment, the love within the relationship will blossom. How-
ever, if love cannot be provided through a perfect commitment device, the love
within the relationship will wither. The growth in love through the relationship
is due to the assumption that love is addictive. Love will wither, without com-
mitment, despite the fact that love is addictive; instead, the addiction property
leads lovers to oversupply initially and recoup their investments later. The other
participant in the match, despite knowing the planned behavior of the user, cannot
reverse the situation.
Another important result is that love within the commitment match will exceed
the love in the non-commitment match. Much like the durable goods monopoly
model, Coase (1972), an imperfect commitment device leads the monopolist to
alter the production stream. In this model, unlike in the durable goods monopoly,
the user wants to reduce future output. Rational partners will respond to the
expected future reduction by demanding less today, which, because of addiction,
means less future demand, and, therefore, less love, for all.
4.1. Commitment. Consider a monogamist, i.e., someone capable of committing
to their partner over the entire period of relationship. Under commitment, the10 STEVEN F. KOCH
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monogamist is able to commit to a stream of love provision, i.e., choose the amount
of love to provide at the beginning of the match and follow it until the end of
the match. The monogamist’s love provision problem is to maximize the utility
associated with the provision of love over the entire life of the relationship, where














Optimal love provision under perfect commitment is governed by the usual ﬁrst






























2 = β(c − σv0(qc
2)).
The conditions are exactly as expected, the marginal return to the provision of ad-
ditional love, including the love addiction component from the adjacent (preceding
or succeeding) period, is equated to the marginal opportunity cost of providing the
addtional love. The marginal cost is subsidized according to the degree of selﬂess-
ness.21 However, condition (7) also points out the potential for future dynamic
inconsistency, which will be more fully discussed below.
Intuitively, increases in demand will lead to increases in production for any proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrm, because they raise the marginal return from production. In this
case, the intuition is that the provision of love within the match is increased when
more love is desired. The necessary conditions, if further analysed,22 would show
that increases in either, α, A, q0, or q3, because those increases represent rising
desires, will lead to an increase in marginal rewards in either of the match periods.
It is also expected that any increase in cost will lead to a decreased willingness of
a supplier to provide the product. In this model, an increase in cost is represented
21Due to the assumption of downward sloping demand and increasing marginal cost, the suﬃcient
conditions for a maximum are easily satisﬁed.
22A formal discussion is provided in Appendix A.1.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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as either an increase in the explicit marginal product cost, c, or as a decrease in
the implicit production subsidy, σ. Therefore, an increase in c or a decrease in σ,
will lead to a decrease in the willingness to provide love.
The impact of time, however, is not as clear. An increase in the valuation
placed on the future, as measured by an increase in β, measures the willingness to
postpone current rewards in exchange for future rewards. Due to addiction, current
love provision is a form of investment in the future desire for the other partner in
the match. If delayed rewards have more value, more rewards will be delayed,
and, therefore, the returns to today’s love provision are greater. Due to addiction,
therefore, the provision of love at the outset will increase if β increases. However,
the provision of love in the future is decreasing in β. Given the fact that period two
represents the end of the relationship, so there is no additional reason to invest in
future love, an increase in the value of future rewards leads to a disproportionate
rise in marginal costs relative to marginal returns.
A person who receives love will seek more love in the future. Because the desire
for love in the future exceeds the current desire, and the provider is a mongamist,
more love will be provided. If love were not addictive, the monogamist would
provide the same amount of love in each period. The romantic expectation that
love should grow throughout the partnership can obtain in this model, where love
is assumed to be addictive and is provided by a committed partner. The result
is formalized below. An illustration of the complete commitment equilibrium is
provided in Figure 1.
Theorem 1. Regardless of the degree of selﬂessness, if love production is addictive,
α > 0, and opportunities for love outside the match are constant, q0 = q3 = ¯ q, love
grows throughout the match duration, i.e., qc
2 > qc
1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
As will be shown, the ability of love to grow in the relationship also depends
upon the strength of the commitment device, i.e., whether or not the love provider
can commit to the speciﬁed path of love provision over the entire relationship. If
the commitment of the provider cannot be believed, the commitment equilibrium
will collapse. Worse, love within the relationship will wither and, potentially, die12 STEVEN F. KOCH
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4.2. Potential Defection from Commitment. If the commitment device is not
perfect, the provider has an incentive to renege on the original promise. The con-
dition governing the commitment choice of future love provision, qc
2, is inﬂuenced
by the commitment level of preceding love production, qc
1. Once time has passed,
it cannot be recaptured. Therefore, any rewards accumulated from love provision
in the past become sunk; those rewards no longer aﬀect current decisions.
Consider the case in which the partner supplied the full-commitment level of
love in the ﬁrst period of the relationship. Once the future has been reached, the
monopoly provider of love faces a utility maximization problem, which is partly










The d superscript represents possible defection from the commitment equilibrium.








2 = c − σv0(qd
2).
As expected, discounting no longer applies.23 In addition, a comparison of equa-
tion (9) with equation (7) shows a clear diﬀerence. The marginal eﬀect of current,
now period two, provision on past provision and happiness is no longer plausible.
The period one result has been achieved, and, importantly, cannot be changed;
therefore, the marginal eﬀect of today’s decision on yesterday’s decision must be
zero; past rewards are sunk. Due to the dynamic inconsistency in the problem,
defection is guaranteed if the recipient in the relationship match is na¨ ıve.
Theorem 2. If commitment cannot be guaranteed, na¨ ıve partners are used. Users
defect by providing less than the scheduled commitment level of love in the ﬁnal
period of the match, i.e., qc
2 > qd
2. In addition, less love is made available than was
available in the past, i.e., qc
1 > qd
2.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
23Further discussion of the properties of this ﬁrst order condition are located in Appendix A.3.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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Importantly, the desire to cheat is not entirely due to the fact that the model is
only over two periods; rather, the reduction is due to the fact that past behaviour
cannot be altered. The limited number of periods in the model does make the user
want to cut production even more than if the model time line was more extensive,
however, the user would still face the incentive to cut production below what was
planned, in every period.
For comparison, in the original durable goods monopoly model, see for example,
Coase (1972) and Gul, Sonnenshein & Wilson (1992), the monopoly defection is
in the direction of extra production, due to the substitutability of the products
through time. When the monopoly output in one time period is a substitute for
the output in the next period, the initial purchaser of the durable product suﬀers
a capital loss; the initial purchaser pays too much for the product having na¨ ıvely
believed the monopolist would not produce more in the future. The externality,
the monopolist does not bear the full cost of future output decisions, eﬀectively
subsidizes production so that the mononpolist will, in fact, produce more in the
future than originally planned.
In this model, where love in one time period complements love in an adjacent
time period, the na¨ ıve initial purchaser receives a capital gain; love is provided
at a price that is below its value to the recipient. The externality, the potential
monogamist cannot collect on the full beneﬁts of current decisions, eﬀectively taxes
the provision of love, thus reducing provision below the amount initially planned.
24
4.3. Commitment Through Subgame Perfection. If one mate is unable to
guarantee commitment to the other, defection is the expected result. Therefore, it
is not reasonable to believe that potential lovers will na¨ ıvely accept the commitment
equilibrium amount of love, initially, since they should expect to be used in the
future. Given the expectation of being used, the love recipient should reduce the
initial desire for love to temper the potential for being used. Due to the addictive
nature of love, the expectation of being used should induce reductions in current
24In addition, there is an end game eﬀect in this two period model. The recipient of love, because
of addiction, is investing in future desires. The asset speciﬁcity of the investment, demand for
future love within the match can only be provided by the same individual, leads to an ex post
hold-up problem, where the user reduces supply to take advantage of that initial investment, which
cannot be recouped anywhere else.14 STEVEN F. KOCH
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desires. Below, a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium to this within-match two-
period game of love is described. In equilibrium, love no longer grows; instead,
love withers, and, therefore, less love is provided within the match in equilibrium.
Equilibrium behaviour in the match is examined via backwards induction, beginning
with the ﬁnal period.
4.3.1. The Final Period. In the ﬁnal period of the match, the potential user de-
termines the amount of love to provide, given the love that was provided in the









Equation (10) is identical to the maximization problem given by equation (8), other
than notation. Therefore, other than notation, the solution follows a necessary







2 = c − σv0(qs
2)
The s superscript connotes the subgame perfect solution. Without a speciﬁcation
on the function v(q), there is no closed form solution to the problem. However,
equation (11) represents an implicit function, qs
2(q1;A,c,α,σ,q3), representing the
choice of current love provision, qs
2, given any possible level of past love, q1.25
4.3.2. The Initial Period. If partners in a love relationship expect to be used, they
will fully incorporate that potential into their decisions. Potential users, will also
incorporate the expected optimal future behavior into their initial decision. Full
use of the information provided by the optimal responses will allow recipients to
receive love from a monogamist, where commitment is guaranteed, not by word or
deed, but by self-interest. Despite the initial assumpton that partners are partially
selﬂess, the provision of love will not be entirely selﬂess.
The selﬂess, but self-interested, love provider will maximize within-match utility,
below. However, the choice of love to supply, especially in the future, is constrained
25The properties of this implicit function are exactly the same as the properties of the defection
quantity implicit function examined in Appendix A.3.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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to be consistent, i.e., future love production must maximize future within-match
utility. Substitution of the consistency constraint, or reaction function for future













The ﬁrst period reaction function is found from the necessary condition for a














= c − σv0(qs
1)
As seen in the preceding problems, marginal returns are equated to subsidized
marginal costs in order for a maximum to exist. Also, the maximum is guaranteed
by the downward sloping demand and rising marginal costs.
Theorem 3. Regardless of the degree of selﬂessness, even if love is addictive,
α > 0, and love opportunities outside the match are constant, q0 = q3 = ¯ q, love
withers throughout the match duration, i.e., qs
1 > qs
2.
Proof. See Appendix B.3 
Figure 2, below, provides a full illustration of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium, and the properties surrounding the equilibrium. Further comparisons between
the two diﬀerent equilibria are provided in the next section.
4.4. Commitment vs. Noncommitment. As has already been shown, within-
match love will grow, as long as commitment can be guaranteed in the relation-
ship. However, if the relationship cannot be based on commitment, love will decay
through the course of the match. Not surprisingly, the total availability of love
under commitment is higher than it is without commitment. More importantly, a
match between committed mates will exchange more love during every period in
which they are matched than the couple that is not committed to their relationship.
26 Another solution involves maximization of the within-match utility based on the choice of
q1, eﬀectively creating an implicit function for q−1
1 (qs
2), which, when combined with the implicit
function for future output, qs
2(q1;A,c,α,σ,q3), will yield a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
path of love provision.16 STEVEN F. KOCH
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Intuitively, love, because there is an addictive component to it, requires invest-
ments for growth. If the buyer perceives a mate who cannot be trusted, that mate
will not fully participate in the relationship. A reduction in participation at the
outset means even less participation in the relationship in the future, due to the
complementary nature of love, i.e., love must be fostered to grow. That intuition
is formalized below, but not explicity proven.
Theorem 4. The provision and receipt of love in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equi-






An outline of the proof is based on a simple ﬁxed point theorem, and is discussed
in Appendix B, where the two functions begin equidistantly from the origin, while
committed optimal responses for future love provision responds more quickly to
increases in initial love provision due to the fact that questionable motives are not
plausible.
Figure 3, which is an overlay of Figure 2 on top of Figure 1, highlights the
similarities and diﬀerences between the two equilibria. The main point of the
illustration is that if the proposed future love cannot be believed, the mate will
not desire as much love as could be made available, initially. The eﬀect of the
reduction in initial love, compounded by the fact that the non-committed partner
has an incentive to reduce future expressions of love, yields a net result of love that
fades, without commitment.27
4.5. Commitment Devices. To this point, actual commitment devices have not
been modeled, because they are not the primary focus of this research. However,
it is worth considering a few marriage traditions, in order to determine whether or
not they elicit eﬀective commitment.
In the case of the durable goods monopolist, for whom dynamic inconsistency
involves a desire to increase production, appropriate commitment entails rental
contracts, production disincentives, or planned obselescence. If the monopolist
rents, instead of selling the product, then the monopolist does not have an incentive
27The strength of this result is also a feature of the end of the game. If the game were not, yet
about to end, there would still be some incentive left for the partner to invest further into the
future, in order to reap the rewards of using.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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to produce any extra, since extra production will reduce the rental price for all units.
Disincentives to produce additional units in the future, such as rebates to previous
purchasers, would reduce the desire of the monopolist to cheat, thus keeping future
production in line with planned production. Finally, planned obselescence reduces
the durability of the item, thus eliminating the intertemporal substitutability of
the monopoly’s output.28
With love, however, the commitment devices must diﬀer from those in the
durable goods monopoly example, due to the fact that love is intertemporally
complementary, rather than substitutable. Due to intertemporal complementar-
ity, defection entails a reduction in the amount of love that was promised within
the match. Therefore, an appropriate commitment device will improve the likeli-
hood of love provision in the future. Current marriage traditions, unfortunately,
do not provide incentives to increase the provision of love in the future. For ex-
ample, explaining the extensive use of engagement rings to represent commitment
to the marriage is a puzzle. In our model, as in its deﬁnition, commitment must
represent a future promise that can be kept. Engagement rings are only current
sunk costs, and do not represent an investment in “love provision”, or the capacity
to love further. Other examples, such as dowries and bride prices, are also only
current expenses, and are not associated with future love and happiness within the
marriage.
Furthermore, the advent of no-fault divorce laws may have lessened the contrac-
tural component of the marriage. In particular, if one of the participants in the
match does not face a breach penalty for not living up to their part of the bargain,
then there will be less incentive to live up to their part of the bargain. In other
words, there may very well be more cheating and using in current matches, then in
past matches.
28However, it should be noted that planned obselescence may not be dynamically consistent,
either. The monopolist will only be willing to upgrade to a new product if expected proﬁts from
the new product exceed the proﬁts to be made by maintaining the current technological level of
the product.18 STEVEN F. KOCH
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5. Conclusions and Extensions
The model in this paper was used to examine the importance of commitment in a
potential love relationship, where love was presumed to be addictive in nature. The
primary result was that commitment was much better for the partners concerned.
If a lover was able to commit at the beginning of the relationship to a path of love
throughout the match, love within the match grew. However, if the commitment
device was not perfect, the incentive in the model was to produce less than the
prescribed amount.
The diﬀerence between commitment and non-commitment in the relationship
examined in this paper is the diﬀerence between love growing through the course of
the relationship and love faltering through the course of the match. Therefore, from
the perspective of potential entrants into a relationship, some form of commitment
must be embedded in the relationship. Whether the commitment is legal, social, or
reputational does not matter; only the enforceability of the commitment matters.
In the paper, cohabitation was used to describe partnerships that were not ini-
tially based upon commitment; rather, as survey participants in other research
have stated (see Ressler & Waters (1995), the cohabitations were viewed as trials.
Furthermore, marriage was used to describe relationships that were based upon
commitment. This research has shown that cohabiting relationships are prone to
failure, through using behaviour; therefore, if people initially choose to cohabit
rather than marry, they may not be able to regain the commitment necessary to
make an actual marriage work at a later stage in their relationships.
The model does not endogenize the relationship behavior with the market, and,
therefore, is unable to completely capture the eﬀects of changes in the ratio of men
relative to women, or the eﬀects search costs have on how the behavior within the
relationship might evolve. Extending the relationship model to multiple periods
and allowing matches to begin or dissolve in any period, could result in diﬀerent
types of relationship paths. One type of relationshop could involve full commitment
between two mates and love would grow throughout that relationship. Another
type of relationship path could involve a series of non-commitment relationships
between people that continually attempt to use each other. Further analysis of thisLOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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idea could prove valuable for further understanding the changes in family structure,
which have recently occurred and may continue into the future.
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Appendix A. Poperties of the Commitment Equilibrium and Defection
In this Appendix, the propoerties of the commitment equilibrium are examined.
In addition, the potential for defection and the properties of the defection decision
are examined.
A.1. Commitment. Equations (6) and (7) could be interpreted in the same fash-
ion as reaction functions. The ﬁrst equation measures the optimal response to
a level of future output, while the second measures the optimal response to the
amount of output in the preceding period. The solution to equation (6) is an
implicit function, qc
1(qc




Lemma 1. The inverse reaction function for qc
1, q
−1
1 (q2;A,c,α,β,σ,q0), is an
increasing linear function of q2. Also, the level of output qc
1 increases with increases
in A, α, β, σ, and q0, but decreases with increases in c.









One of the suﬃcient conditions for a maximum requires marginal costs to be rising
faster than marginal revenues. Given linear demand and increasing marginal costs,
the condition is easily satisﬁed. The condition, with regards to this problem states
σv00(qc
1) − 2 < 0, which is obviously true since σ ≥ 0 and v00(qc
1) < 0.
The shape of the inverse reaction function is determined by looking at the slope



















The diﬀerential measured in equation (15), which is the slope of the inverse reaction
function, is positive; the denominator is positive by the assumption of positive
parameter values, while the numerator is positive because it is the opposite of22 STEVEN F. KOCH
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the condition required for a maximum to exist. The shape of the inverse reaction
function, measured by the derivative of the slope of the inverse reaction function
in equation (16) is linear because v000 = 0, by assumption.
Other properties of the inverse reaction function can be found by discerning the
eﬀect of any diﬀerential on the qc
1 diﬀerenial. Deﬁning z1 = [2 − σv00(qc
1)]−1 > 0,




























= −z1 < 0.
The signs all follow from the deﬁnition of z1 and the assumption that all of the
parameters are deﬁned to be positive real numbers. 
Furthermore, the provision of love in the ﬁnal period can be examined.
Lemma 2. The reaction function for qc
2, qc
2(q1;A,c,α,β,σ,q3) is an increasing
linear function of q1. In addition, the reaction function increases with increases in
A, α, σ, and q3, but decreases with increases in c, and β.
Proof. Taking total diﬀerentials of equation (7) results in the following equation.
dqc
2[β(σv00(qc
2) − 2)] + βv0(qc
2)dσ + βdA + αβdq3 + dα(βq3 + (1 + β)qc
1)
+dβ[A + α(qc
1 + q3) − 2qc
2 − c + σv0(qc
2)] + α(1 + β)dqc
1 − βdc =0
(17)
One of the suﬃcient conditions for a maximum requires marginal costs to be rising
faster than marginal revenues. Given linear demand and increasing marginal costs,LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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the condition is easily satisﬁed. The condition, with regards to this problem states
σv00(qc
2) − 2 < 0, which is obviously true since σ ≥ 0 and v00(qc
2) < 0.
The shape of the reaction function is determined by looking at the slope of the






















2))2 = 0. (19)
The diﬀerential measured in equation (18), which is the slope of the reaction func-
tion, is positive; the numerator is positive by the assumption of positive parameter
values, while the denominator is positive because it is the opposite of the condition
required for a maximum to exist. The shape of the reaction function, measured by
the derivative of the slope of the reaction function in equation (19) is linear because
v000 = 0, by assumption.
Other properties of the inverse reaction function can be found by discerning the
eﬀect of any diﬀerential on the qc
2 diﬀerenial. Deﬁning zc
2 = [2 − σv00(qc
2)]−1 > 0,

































2 · [A + αqc
1 + αq3 − 2qc
2 − c + σv0(qc
2)] < 0.
The signs all follow from the deﬁnition of z2 and the assumption that all of the
parameters are deﬁned to be positive real numbers, with the exception of the last
property. The numerator of the comparitive static with respect to β is the same as24 STEVEN F. KOCH
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the necessary condition for a maximum in equation (7) except for αqc
1 > 0, which
is missing. Therefore, if the necessary condition is zero, the necessary condition
without a positive portion must be negative.

Intuitively, increases in demand will lead to increases in production for any proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrm. In this case, the intuition is that the provision of love within the
match is increased when love is more desired. For that reason, increases in either,
α, A, q0, or q3, because those increases represent rising desires, will lead to an
increase in either of the aforementioned reaction functions. It is also expected that
any increase in cost will lead to a decreased willingness of a supplier to provide the
product. In this model, an increase in cost is represented as either an increase in
the explicit marginal product cost, c, or as a decrease in the implicit production
subsidy, σ. Therefore, an increase in c or a decrease in σ, will lead to a decrease in
both reaction functions.
An increase in the valuation of future proﬁts, as measured by an increase in
β, measures the willingness to postpone current rewards in exchange for future
rewards. Due to addiction, current production and sales are a form of investment
in future demand. If delayed rewards have more value, due to an increase in β,
more rewards will be delayed, and, therefore, the provider of love is willing to
provide more today. Due to addiction, therefore, the reaction function for love
provision at the outset will increase if β increases. However, the period two reaction
function is decreasing in β. Given the fact that period two represents the end of the
relationship, so there is no additional reason to invest in future love, an increase
in the value of future rewards leads to a disproportionate rise in marginal costs
relative to marginal returns. The direct consequences of the preceding two lemmas
are stated below in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The equilibrium quantities of full-commitment love production are in-
creasing in the addiction parameter, α, the measure of selﬂessness, σ, the extent
of the market, A, and out-of-relationship love, q0 and q3. However, the equilibrium
commitment quantities decrease with increases in the cost of production, c, andLOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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change indeterminantly with respect to the producer’s valuation of future rewards,
β.
Proof. Combining the eﬀects on each of the separate reaction functions is suﬃcient
for proving the theorem. 
Although the properties of the equilibrium are now well understood, because the
properties of the reaction functions are well understood, the actual equilibrium has
not been pinned down. In order to complete the analysis, the intersection of the
reaction functions must be obtained. A ﬁnal solution, therefore, relies on a more
complete analysis of the reaction functions. Under very general conditions, it is
possible to determine the optimal level of output in any one time period, given
no production in the adjacent time period. Supplementing the general conditions
with an additional symmetry assumption forces some symmetry on the reaction
functions. Furthermore, in order to determine the actual equilibrium values, it is
necessary to pin down the reaction function intercepts. These intercepts are made
explicit, below.
Lemma 4. Assuming love possibilities outside the match are constant, q0 = q3 = ¯ q,
production in each period, given no production in the adjacent time period, will be
equal, i.e., q
−1c
1 (q2 = 0;A,c,α,β,σ, ¯ q) = qc
2(q1 = 0;A,c,α,β,σ, ¯ q), i.e., reaction
functions have the same axis intercept value.
Proof. Rewriting the conditions in equations (6) and (7), which are necessary for a
maximum, assuming q0 = q3 = ¯ q, yields
A + α¯ q − 2q1 = c − σv0(q1) (20)
and
β(A + α¯ q − 2q2) = β(c − v0(q2)) (21)
The solution to the equation, although not of closed form, is such that q1 does not
depend upon q2, while q2 does not depend upon q1. In addition, the solution to
each equation must be the same, i.e., only qc
1(q2 = 0) = qc
2(q1 = 0) will solve either
equation, since each equation is functionally equivalent to the other equation. 26 STEVEN F. KOCH
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These lemmas are the basis for the proof of the main commitment equilibrium
result, which is presented in the following Appendix subsection.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1. The result of Lemma 4 is that the reaction function
for q1 starts as far to the right of the origin as the reaction function for q2 starts
above the origin. The result of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 is that the reaction functions
are linear and increasing. The combination of these three lemmas allows for the use
of a geometric result. First, an intersection will occur as long as the lower function
has a greater slope than the function above it, in this case, as long as the reaction
function for q1 has a greater slope than that for q2. Second, the intersection will
occur above the 45◦ line, on which q1 = q2, if the multiplication of the slopes
exceeds one. The intersection will occur below the 45◦ line if the multiplication of
the slopes yields a number less than one.





















The ﬁnal result is due to the fact that 2 − σv00(q2) = 2 − σv00(q1), because v000 = 0,
since v is a quadratic function. The fact that the multiplied slopes exceed one
results in equilibrium values above the 45◦ line, i.e., qc∗
1 < qc∗
2 . 
A.3. Potential for Defection and Properties. Now that the commitment equi-
librium has been discussed, it is necessary to outline the impact of defection from
that commitment. The result is described below.
Lemma 5. The potential defection reaction function for the ﬁnal period within
match output, qd
2, is increasing in A, α, q3, qc
1, and σ; however, the level of con-
sumption is decreasing in c.
Proof. Taking total diﬀerentials of equation (9) results in the following equation.
(23) dqs
2(σv00(qs
2) − 2) + v0(qc
2)dσ + dA + αdq3 + dα(q3 + qs
1) + αdqs
1 − dc = 0LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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One of the suﬃcient conditions for a maximum requires marginal costs to be rising
faster than marginal revenues. Given linear demand and increasing marginal costs,
the condition is easily satisﬁed. The condition, with regards to this problem states
σv00(qd
2) − 2 < 0, which is obviously true since σ ≥ 0 and v00(qd
2) < 0.
The shape of the reaction function is determined by looking at the slope of the






















2))2 = 0. (25)
The diﬀerential measured in equation (24), which is the slope of the reaction func-
tion, is positive; the numerator is positive by the assumption of positive parameter
values, while the denominator is positive because it is the opposite of the condition
required for a maximum to exist. The shape of the reaction function, measured
by the derivative of the slope of the reaction function in equation (25), is linear
because v000 = 0, by assumption.
Other properties of the inverse reaction function can be found by discerning the
eﬀect of any diﬀerential on the qd
2 diﬀerenial. Deﬁning zd
2 = [2 − σv00(qd
2)]−1 > 0,




























2 < 0.28 STEVEN F. KOCH
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The signs all follow from the deﬁnition of zd
2 and the assumption that all of the
parameters are deﬁned to be positive real numbers, with the exception of the last
property.

The intuition behind the properties of the potential defection reaction function
for the production of love in the ﬁnal period mirror the properties of the commit-
ment equilibrium reaction functions. The reaction function will rise if marginal
revenue is increased, but will fall if marginal costs are increased. Increases in A,
the extent of the market, α, the degree of addiction, q1, preceding love production,
and q3, out of match love expectations, increase demand, subsequently increasing
marginal revenue. On the other hand, an increase in c, the explicit constant cost
of love production, and a decrease in σ, the degree of selﬂessness (an implicit sub-
sidy to love production), will lead to an increase in eﬀective marginal costs, and,
subsequently, to a reduction in love provision.
Lemma 6. Assuming love possibilities outside the match are constant, q0 = q3 = ¯ q,
production in each period, even in the case of potential defection, given no produc-
tion in the adjacent time period, will be equal, i.e., q
−1
1 (q2 = 0) = qd
2(q1 = 0).
Proof. Rewriting the conditions in equations (6) and (9), which are necessary for a
maximum, assuming q0 = q3 = ¯ q, yields
A + α¯ q − 2q1 = c − σv0(q1) (26)
and
β(A + α¯ q − 2q2) = β(c − v0(q2)) (27)
The solution to the system, although not of closed form, is such that q1 does not
depend upon q2, while q2 does not depend upon q1. In addition, the solution must
be the same for each time period, i.e., only qc
1 = qd
2 will solve the previous system of
equations, since each equation in the system is functionally equivalent to the other
equation in the system. LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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2 − β(c − σv0(qc







2 − β(c − σv0(qd
2)) = 0, (29)
where equation (29) is the β multiple of equation (9). If qc
2 > qd
2, then the substi-
tution of qc






2 − β(c − σv0(qc
2)) < 0.














which is the required result. Therefore, qc
2 exceeds qd
2. 
Appendix B. Properties of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In this appendix the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibriu is examined in detail,
beginning with the ﬁnal period.
B.1. The Final Period. In the ﬁnal period, ﬁrst period outcomes are taken as
given.
Lemma 7. The reaction function for ﬁnal period within match output, qs
2, is in-
creasing in A, α, q3, q1, and σ; however, the level of production is decreasing in
c.
Proof. Taking total diﬀerentials of equation (7) results in the following equation.
(30) dqs
2(σv00(qs
2) − 2) + v0(qc
2)dσ + dA + αdq3 + dα(q3 + qs
1) + αdqs
1 − dc = 0
One of the suﬃcient conditions for a maximum requires marginal costs to be rising
faster than marginal revenues. Given linear demand and increasing marginal costs,30 STEVEN F. KOCH
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the condition is easily satisﬁed. The condition, with regards to this problem states
σv00(qs
2) − 2 < 0, which is obviously true since σ ≥ 0 and v00(qs
2) < 0.
The shape of the reaction function is determined by looking at the slope of the






















2))2 = 0. (32)
The diﬀerential measured in equation (31), which is the slope of the reaction func-
tion, is positive; the numerator is positive by the assumption of positive parameter
values, while the denominator is positive because it is the opposite of the condition
required for a maximum to exist. The shape of the reaction function, measured
by the derivative of the slope of the reaction function in equation (32), is linear
because v000 = 0, by assumption.
Other properties of the inverse reaction function can be found by discerning the
eﬀect of any diﬀerential on the qs
2 diﬀerenial. Deﬁning zs
2 = [2 − σv00(qs
2)]−1 > 0,





























The signs all follow from the deﬁnition of zs
2 and the assumption that all of the
parameters are deﬁned to be positive real numbers, with the exception of the last
property.LOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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Comparing the statics concerning the degree of addiction from Appendix 2, with











2 · (q3 + qs
1) > 0









In addition, a comparison of the statics on the slope of the reaction functions from






























In other words, given any particular level of q2, the slope of the commitment reaction
function will exceed the slope of the subgame perfect reaction function. Also, at
any level of q2, the eﬀect of a change in α on that q2 will be smaller in the subgame
perfect reaction function than in the commitment reaction function. 
The intution behind the properties of the non-commitment reaction function for
the production of love in the ﬁnal period mirror the properties of the commitment
equilibrium reaction functions. The reaction function will rise if marginal revenue is
increased, but will fall if marginal costs are increased. Increases in A, the extent of
the relative desire for love, α, the degree of addiction, q1, preceding love production,
and q3, out of match love expectations, increase demand, subsequently increasing
marginal revenue. On the other hand, an increase in c, the explicit constant cost
of love production, and a decrease in σ, the degree of selﬂessness (an implicit32 STEVEN F. KOCH
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subsidy to love production), will lead to an increase in eﬀective marginal costs,
and, subsequently, to a reduction in love provision.
B.2. Initial Period. The above condition deﬁning the reaction function for love
provision is exactly the same as the condition deﬁning the reaction function for
initial period love production under perfect commitment, given by equation (6),
with the exception of the notation. Therefore, the following lemma is stated without
proof, as the proof is exactly the same as the proof for the reaction function for qc
1
given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 8. The inverse reaction function for qs
1, q
−1
1 (q2;A,c,α,β,σ,q0), is an
increasing linear function in q2. Also the level of output, qs
1, increases in A, α, β,
σ, and q0, but decreases in c.
The properties of the two equilibrium levels of love provisin are very similar as
well. As was the case with the commitment equilibrium, either reaction function
increases when marginal revenues increase or when marginal costs fall. The results
from Lemma 8 and Lemma 7 suggests that increases in the extent of the market,
the degree of addiction, and out-of-match love production, or an increase in the
relative valuation of future proﬁtability all represent increases in demand (or in
the valuation of demand), and, therefore, will result in increases in love production
within each peroiod of the match. Additionally, an increase in the implicit subsidy
to love production or a decrease in the explicit marginal cost of love production,
which are reductions in marginal costs, will result in increases in the amount of
love produced in each of the epochs within the relationship. The following theorem
formalizes the intuition.
Lemma 9. The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium path of within match love pro-
duction is increasing in A, α, β, q0, q3, and σ, but decreasing in c.
Proof. The proof is a direct result of the combination of the proofs of Lemma 8
and Lemma 7. 
The characterization of the equilibrium, although important, is not the result of
primary interest; instead, the actual level of equilibrium love production in eachLOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
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period is the result to be considered. Simultaneously solving the two reaction
functions, q
−1
1 (·) and qs
2(·), will yield the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium levels
of love production within the match. When commitment is self-enforcing, love
provision within the match will decrease through time. In other words, love does
not grow in the relationship, it decays.
Lemma 10. Assuming love possibilities outside the match are constant, q0 = q3 =
¯ q, production in each period, given no production in the adjacent time period, will
be equal, i.e., q
−1
1 (0;A,c,α,β,σ, ¯ q) = qs
2(0;A,c,α,σ, ¯ q).
Proof. Rewriting the conditions in equations (13) and (11), which are necessary for
a maximum, assuming q0 = q3 = ¯ q, yields
A + α¯ q − 2q1 = c − σv0(q1) (33)
and
β(A + α¯ q − 2q2) = β(c − v0(q2)) (34)
The solution to the either equation, although not of closed form, is such that q1 does
not depend upon q2, while q2 does not depend upon q1. In addition, the solution to
each equation must be the same, i.e., only q1 = q2 will solve either equation, since
each equation is functionally equivalent to the other equation. 
Lemma 11. Regardless of the type of commitment, production of love in the
last period of the match is the same if there is no initial production of love, i.e.,
qs∗
2 (0;A,c,α,σ,q3) = qc∗
2 (0;A,c,α,β,σ,q3).
Proof. See Appendix B.4 
B.3. Proof of Theorem 3. The result of Lemma 10 is that the reaction function
for qs
1 starts as far to the right of the origin as the reaction function for qs
2 starts
above the origin. The result of Lemma 1 and Lemma 7 is that the reaction functions
are linear and increasing. The combination of these three lemmas allows for the use
of a geometric result. First, an intersection will occur as long as the lower function
has a greater slope than the function above it, in this case, as long as the reaction34 STEVEN F. KOCH
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function for qc
1 has a greater slope than that for qs
2. Second, the intersection will
occur above the 45◦ line, on which qs
1 = qs
2, if the multiplication of the slopes
exceeds one. The intersection will occur below the 45◦ line if the multiplication of
the slopes yields a number less than one.





















The ﬁnal result is due to the fact that 2 − σv00(q2) = 2 − σv00(q1), because v000 = 0,
or v is a quadratic function.
The fact that the multiplied slopes is less than one results in equilibrium values
below the 45◦ line, i.e., qs∗
1 > qs∗
2 . 
B.4. Proof of Lemma 12.
Lemma 12. Regardless of the type of commitment, production of love in the
last period of the match is the same if there is no initial production of love, i.e.,
qs∗
2 (0;A,c,α,σ,q3) = qc∗
2 (0;A,c,α,β,σ,q3).
Rewriting the conditions in equations (13) and (11) assuming q1 = 0 and sub-
stituting in for p2 using equation (2), yields
β(A + αq3 − 2qc
2) = β(c − v0(qc
2)) (36)
and
β(A + αq3 − 2qs
2) = β(c − v0(qs
2)) (37)
The only diﬀerence between the two equations is the notation for q2. Therefore,
the solutions must be the same. 
Proof. According to Lemma 12, the Subgame Perfect optimal response function in
the second period starts at the same point as the Commitment optimal response
function. According to Lemma 8 and Lemma 1, the optimal response functionsLOVE AND ADDICTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT
† 35
for the choice of initial production are: (a) the same, and (b) increasing in q2.
Therefore, the fact that the committed optimal response in the future is steeper
than the Subgame Perfect best response function is enough to prove the Theorem
(compare slopes in Lemma 2 with the slope calculated in Lemma 7).      
 
 































For q1, the increase is due to an increase in A, α, β, σ, and q0; or 
a decrease in c.  For q2, the increase is due to an increase in A, 
α, σ, and q3; or a decrease in β, or c. 
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For q1, the increase is due to an increase in A, α, β, σ, and q0; or 
a decrease in c.  For q2, the increase is due to an increase in A, 
α, σ, and q3; or a decrease in c. 
 








































Figure 3.  Commitment Equilibrium Compared to the 
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
 